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STOCK UNLOADING AND BANKER INCENTIVES
Robert j Jackson, Jr.*
Congress has directedfederal regulators to oversee banker pay. For the
first time, these regulators are now scrutinizing the incentives of risk-takers
beyond the bank's top executives. Like most public company managers, these
bankers are increasingly paid in stock rather than cash. The ostensible reason is that stock-based pay aligns manager and shareholder interests. But
portfolio theory predicts that managers will diversify away, or "unload,"
stock-based pay unless they are restrictedfrom doing so. One way to deter
unloading may be to require managers to disclose it, as investors and colleagues will assume that managers are unloading because they are unmotivated or think their stock is overvalued.
Using rare data on stock unloadingat Goldman Sachs, this Essay provides the first empirical study of incentives throughout a bank's managerial
hierarchy. I find that bankers paid in stock soon sell a nearly equivalent
amount, unless they have to disclose, in which case they sell much less. These
findings suggest that regulatorsconcerned about incentives need information
on bankers' overall equity holdings, including the effects of unloading. They
also suggest that pre-crisis disclosure rules encourage executives to maintain
dangerously concentrated positions in their bank's stock.
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INTRODUCTION

Part of Congress's reaction to the financial crisis was to direct federal
regulators to oversee banker pay. In response, the regulators have looked
for the first time at the incentives of risk-takers who are not among the
bank's senior leaders but whose actions can still threaten systemic stability. 1 These bankers are increasingly paid in stock rather than cash, on the
view that stock-based pay aligns manager and shareholder interests. But
portfolio theory predicts that individuals prefer a diversified portfolio
over concentrated exposure to one firm. Thus, bankers may diversify
away, or "unload," their stock-based pay, for example by selling shares of
stock. One way to deter unloading may be to require that it be disclosed,
as colleagues and investors to whom unloading is revealed may conclude
that the banker is unmotivated or thinks that the stock is overpriced. But
no previous work has studied whether disclosure does, in fact, deter unloading. And little is known about unloading by the traders and other
bankers who have recently become the focus of regulators' attention, because these managers, unlike "executives," are not covered by the standard disclosure rules included in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2
In this Essay, I provide the first empirical study of unloading
throughout a bank's managerial hierarchy. The study analyzes stock compensation and unloading among hundreds of Goldman Sachs's senior
managers, including both "executives" and other bankers whose activities
may be systemically important. The evidence reveals two significant findings. First, Goldman managers do, in fact, diversify away most of the in1. See, e.g., Executive Compensation Oversight After the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th
Cong. 39 (2010) (statement of Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System) [hereinafter Alvarez Testimony] ("[C]ompensation
arrangements for executive and non-executive employees alike may pose safety and
soundness risks if not properly structured . . . ." (emphasis in original)).

2. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
(2006)).
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centive effects of their stock-based pay. Second, bankers who are required
to disclose unload much less. The same managers unload less when they
have to disclose than when they do not, and they unload more when they
are not required to disclose but know they soon will be.
It would be imprudent to change regulatory policy based on findings
at a single firm. Study of unloading at Goldman Sachs's competitorsand at non-bank public companies as well-is needed. To the extent,
however, that unloading at Goldman is indicative of unloading generally-and there is good reason to believe that it is-these findings have
important implications for policymakers and investors.
For one thing, regulators who are concerned with incentives need
information on bankers' overall equity holdings, which incorporate the
effects of unloading, rather than the aggregate amount of stock the bankers are paid. Second, regulators should acknowledge that the current disclosure regime may encourage excessive risk-taking by inducing bank executives to maintain large, undiversified positions in the bank's stock that
allow executives, like other bank shareholders, to internalize the profits
from risk-taking while sharing losses with depositors and taxpayers.
More generally, shareholders and lawmakers who want to make
stock-based pay a better device for aligning manager and owner incentives should consider whether non-executives should also have to disclose
unloading. And because section 16 of the Exchange Act already requires
executives to disclose unloading, securities regulators should reassess its
scope to ensure that its reach encompasses only those managers for
whom stock ownership provides effective incentives.
The remainder of the Essay proceeds as follows. Part I describes
stock compensation at public companies and the disclosure rules that
govern its use. Part II presents evidence on stock unloading at Goldman
Sachs. Part III discusses implications for bank regulators, shareholders,
and lawmakers concerned about the incentive effects of stock-based pay.
Part IV concludes.
I.

STOCK COMPENSATION, UNLOADING, AND DISCLOSURE

In large, public corporations the interests of managers and owners
frequently diverge. 3 Increasingly public companies attempt to address
this divergence by paying managers in stock rather than cash. 4 But man3. For the seminal articulation of the agency problem that arises from the separation
of ownership and control over corporate decisionmaking, see AdolfA. Berle & Gardiner C.
Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (11 th ed. 2010); Michael C. Jensen
& William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3J. Fin. Econ. 305, 312-30 (1976).
4. For example, according to one study, the median large public company granted
1% of its outstanding shares to its employees in the form of stock compensation for the
year 2008 alone. Pearl Meyer & Partners, 2008 Equity Stake Study 3 (2008), available at
http://www.pearlmeyer.com/Pearl/media/PearlMeyer/PDF/2008PMPEquityStakeStudy.
pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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agers are risk-averse, and their salaries, along with their professional reputations, are already exposed to the fortunes of the firm. 5 Thus, portfolio
theory predicts that they will respond to receiving pay in stock by diversifying away the risk associated with the stock (or "unloading"), for example by selling the shares, undermining the incentive effects that would
otherwise be achieved by stock compensation. 6
Most managers are free to unload without disclosing these transactions. But section 16 requires all public companies to identify the managers who exercise policymaking authority at the firm as "executives" and
disclose their unloading. 7 Previous work on section 16 has focused almost
exclusively on its merits as a means of regulating insider trading. 8 In this
Essay, I examine a related, but unappreciated, consequence of section 16's disclosure rules. Because observers cannot distinguish between
unloading motivated by managers' preference for diversification and unloading motivated by inside information, disclosure of managers' unloading sends costly signals to markets, colleagues, and the public. Thus, section 16's disclosure rules may deter managerial diversification.
The majority of stock compensation at U.S. public companies is paid
to non-executives like the traders and other bankers who do not serve as
leaders of their firms. 9 But, because their unloading is not disclosed, no
previous work has evaluated whether non-executives unload in response
to receiving stock-based pay. And, because most publicly available data on
unloading are limited to executives, no previous study has compared how
the same managers unload when they are subject to section 16 and when
they are not.
5. Following the broader literature on the incentives of senior managers, I assume for
purposes of this Essay that managers are risk-averse. See, e.g.,John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay
& David F. Larcker, Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, FRBNY
Econ. Pol'y Rev., Apr. 2003, at 27, 33 (summarizing this literature). Importantly, however,
this assumption is disputed, see, for example, Victor P. Goldberg, Aversion to Risk Aversion
in the New Institutional Economics, 146J. Inst. & Theoretical Econ. 216, 216 (1990), and
future research on managerial incentives would benefit from closer consideration of the
organizational and institutional circumstances under which managers may prefer exposure
to the stock of their firms. See infra Part IV.
6. See, e.g., Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of
Investments 274-97 (1959).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 19-22. Although the language of section 16
itself refers to these employees as "officers," the relevant regulations borrow the definition
of this term from the definition of "executive officer" elsewhere in the Exchange Act, see
infra note 20, and practitioners generally refer to these managers as "executives." For ease
of exposition, throughout this Essay I refer to those subject to section 16 as "executives,"
and to all other managers as "non-executives."
8. See, e.g., Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law § 8.6, at 295 (1986) (summarizing
this literature).
9. See John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay, Stock Option Plans for Non-Executive
Employees, 61 J. Fin. Econ. 253, 254 (2001) [hereinafter Core & Guay, Stock Option
Plans] (finding, in sample of 756 large public companies, that 67% of stock options issued
by firms were held by non-executives).
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A. Stock Compensation and Unloading
Stock compensation is paid in two principal forms: stock awards and
stock options. Stock awards are actual shares of the firm's stock, which
rise and fall in tandem with the stock price. Stock options, by contrast,
give the manager the right to purchase a share of stock at a specified
exercise price. Both forms are now standard components of managers'
pay at U.S. public companies in general and at large financial institutions
in particular. 10
Both stock awards and stock options expose the manager to unsystematic risk related to her employer's stock price, so portfolio theory
predicts that receiving either will induce the manager to diversify by unloading. A manager can unload a stock award by selling an equivalent
number of shares of the company's stock. If she has received stock options, the manager can unload by exercising the options and selling the
shares she acquires. The extent to which stock compensation succeeds in
aligning incentives depends on whether a manager's overall equity holdings increase after taking into account the effects of unloading."1
Because most public companies assert that the purpose of stock compensation is to align manager and shareholder interests, one might expect firms to adopt limitations on unloading by contract. In practice,
such restrictions are rare. 1 2 Since portfolio theory indicates that managers' unloading will undermine the incentive benefits of stock compensation, and firms do not generally contract around that result, an extensive
literature argues that stock-based pay serves other purposes, such as preservation of liquidity, reducing costs of capital associated with adverse selection, and obtaining important tax benefits.1 3 Nevertheless, most public
10. See Pearl Meyer & Partners, supra note 4, at 7 (finding that, among sample of 200
large U.S. public companies, median firm has reserved 6.0% of its shares for all previously
issued awards of stock-based pay); id. (finding that median securities firm has reserved
21.5% of its shares for this purpose).
11. For ease of exposition, throughout this Essay I refer to managers' holdings in the
stock of their firms after accounting for the effects of unloading as the manager's "equity
holdings."
12. See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal
Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 440, 461 (2000) (noting that,
although some firms require senior managers to own minimum amount of firm's stock,
"the press has reported that such ownership guidelines often are not enforced"); see also
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1915, 1934 (2010) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Fried, Long-Term Performance] (noting
that "target" amounts of stock ownership under these guidelines "have tended to be low,"
and "in many cases, the targets were purely voluntary").
13. See, respectively, Core & Guay, Stock Option Plans, supra note 9, at 275-76,
278-79 & tbls.6-7 (finding "strong evidence that stock option grants are more heavily used
by companies with cash constraints"), Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Financing
Decisions: Who Issues Stock?, 76 J. Fin. Econ. 549, 550-51, 554 (2005) (arguing that
issuances of stock-based pay to employees are among "prime candidates" for addressing
adverse selection effects in capital markets), and Ilona Babenko & Yuri Tserlukevich,
Analyzing Tax Benefits from Employee Stock Options, 64 J. Fin. 1797, 1799 (2009)
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companies assert that stock-based pay is intended to link manager and
shareholder wealth, 14 and in this Essay I focus on whether stock-based pay
serves this purpose. Answering that question requires close study of
unloading.
From the manager's perspective, the benefits of diversification depend on the magnitude of her existing holdings of stock as a proportion
of her overall wealth. Thus, all things equal, we would expect managers
with larger existing holdings of stock to unload more in response to
stock-based pay than managers with little existing exposure.
Previous empirical study in this area has generally been limited to
the executives who are required to disclose unloading. 1 5 This work confirms that executives unload in response to stock compensation, 16 and
(finding that, in sample of public companies, paying equivalent salary in lieu of stock
options would increase average firm's federal income tax liability by $12.6 million). In
addition to these firm-level benefits, agreements associated with stock-based pay usually
require managers to remain employed in order to fully "vest" in, or earn, an award of stock
compensation, serving an important retention function, see, for example, Christopher D.
Ittner et al., The Structure and Performance Consequences of Equity Grants to Employees
of New Economy Firms, 34J. Acct. & Econ. 89, 90 (2003), and options give employees the
ability to defer individual income taxation, see Schizer, supra note 12, at 469 ("By not
exercising [a stock option], the executive can defer the tax on her profit from the option,
thereby reducing the tax's real impact.").
14. See, e.g., Assurant, Inc., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Schedule 14A), at B-1 (Apr. 10, 2008) ("The purpose of
this [plan] is to . . . provid[e] incentives directly linked to stockholder value."); Morgan
Stanley, Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Schedule 14A), at 58 (Apr. 14, 2011) (indicating that company's stock compensation plan
"provides employees with long-term incentives that are aligned with shareholder
interests").
15. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger Spamann, The Wages of
Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008, 27 Yale J. on
Reg. 257, 260 (2010) (finding executives at two large financial institutions "regularly took
large amounts of money off the table by unloading shares and options"); Sanjai Bhagat &
Brian Bolton, Bank Executive Compensation and Capital Requirements Reform 15 (Mar.
8, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding same
for larger group of financial institutions). While other work has evaluated disclosures that
public companies must provide on firm-wide stock-option plans, see 17 C.F.R. § 229.201 (d)
(2011), those disclosures do not provide individualized detail on unloading activity and
hence are of limited use in evaluating individual employees' incentives. See, e.g., Core &
Guay, Stock Option Plans, supra note 9, at 262-63 (noting that these disclosures "do not
[provide] information on individual grants" of stock-based pay and describing limits of
analysis based on those disclosures given that unloading "decisions are made at the
individual . . . level"); see also Steven Huddart & Mark Lang, Information Distribution
Within Firms: Evidence from Stock Option Exercises, 34J. Acct. & Econ. 3, 3-4 (2003)
(analyzing correlation between "firm-wide stock option exercise in a month" and "excess
stock returns in the subsequent 6 months).
16. See Eli Ofek & David Yermack, Taking Stock: Equity-Based Compensation and the
Evolution of Managerial Ownership, 55 J. Fin. 1367, 1368 (2000) (finding that unloading
"effectively neutralize[s] much of the incentive impact of high-ownership managers' stockbased pay"); cf. J. Carr Bettis, John M. Bizjak & Michael L. Lemmon, Managerial
Ownership, Incentive Contracting, and the Use of Zero-Cost Collars and Equity Swaps by
Corporate Insiders, 36 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 345, 346 (2001) (finding that
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that the magnitude of this effect depends on the executive's overall stock
holdings.

17

B. Unloading and Disclosure
Most managers of large public companies are not required to disclose unloading. But section 16 requires public companies to identify
their executives and to publicly and immediately disclose their unloading.1 8 Managers' tendency to unload may be muted if they are required
to disclose it, because disclosure of unloading imposes costs on managers,
sending signals to both markets and colleagues that the executive has
negative inside information. By making diversification more costly for executives, rules requiring disclosure of unloading may lead them to maintain concentrated exposure to their employer's stock. Thus, section 16's
disclosure rules may have previously unappreciated implications for managers' incentives.
1. DisclosureRules. - Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, a provision thought to regulate insider trading, 19 requires all public
companies to identify managers who perform "policy-making" functions
as "executives". 20 The firms themselves are generally free to make the
determination as to which managers will be deemed executives. 21 Upon
executives "use [hedging transactions] to cover a significant proportion of their holdings
of the firm's stock").
17. See Ofek & Yermack, supra note 16, at 1368 (concluding that executives with
higher levels of existing stock ownership are more likely to unload in response to stockbased pay).
18. See supra text accompanying note 7. Section 16 also requires disgorgement from
executives of any profit earned from "short-swing" purchases and sales of the firm's stock
within a six-month period, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006), and separately prohibits executives
from selling their employer's stock "short," id. § 78p(c). Those provisions, and particularly
section 16(b)'s prohibition on short-swing profits, have been the focus of prior work on the
influence of section 16 on managerial incentives. See Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading
Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory of Section 16(b), 92 Mich. L.
Rev. 2088, 2090 (1994). In this Essay, however, I focus on the implications of section 16's
disclosure rules for incentives; section 16(b) is unlikely to influence the relationship
between stock-based pay and executives' unloading. See infra note 55.
19. See, e.g., Kern Cnty. Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 591
(1973) (noting that preamble of section 16(b) specifies that it was enacted "[flor the
purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by"
insiders (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b))).
20. See Reports of Directors, Officers, and Principal Shareholders, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.16a-l(f), 240.16a-2 (2011) (specifying that section 16 applies to each firm's
"president, principal financial officer, principal accounting officer .... ..
any vicepresident.., in charge of a principal business unit, division or function..., [or] any other
officer who performs a policy-making function").
21. Cf. Peter J. Romeo & Alan J. Dye, Section 16 Treatise and Reporting Guide
§ 2.01[e], at 72 (Michael Gettelman ed., 3d ed. 2011) (describing case- and contextspecific nature of this determination). Practitioners with significant experience in
section 16 matters could not recall a case after 1980 in which the SEC has formally
challenged a firm's section 16 determinations. E-mail from Alan L. Dye, Partner, Hogan
Lovells LLP, to Robert J. Jackson, Jr. (Dec. 13, 2010, 10:00 PM EST) (on file with the
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being identified as an executive, the manager must disclose her overall
holdings of stock. Thereafter, she must disclose any transaction in the
stock (including any unloading), and her resulting ownership, in the
22
SEC's public database and on the company's website within two days.
Thus, executives' unloading is immediately revealed; for other managers,
unloading is generally never disclosed.
2. Private Costs of Disclosure. - The merits of section 16's disclosure
requirements as a means of regulating insider trading have been the subject of considerable debate. 23 I focus on another consequence of these
rules: that they deter executives from unloading. For three reasons, these
rules make diversification far more costly for executives than for managers who are not subject to section 16.
a. Market Signals. Unloading reduces managers' exposure to
losses if the firm decreases in value, so observers cannot distinguish unloading motivated by diversification from unloading motivated by negative inside information. Thus, while rules requiring disclosure of insiders'
trades may convey valuable information to market participants, the rules
simultaneously deter unloading.2 4 Regardless whether a manager's unloading is motivated by the need to diversify or by inside information,
disclosure of the transaction may signal to markets that the manager has
25
negative information about the firm's future prospects.
Columbia Law Review). Even older cases in which the SEC pursued such a challenge are
rare. See, e.g., Colby v. Kiune, 178 F.2d 872, 875 (2d Cir. 1949) (describing one of few
reported challenges); John G. Gillis, Securities Law and Regulation: Inside Information
Developments, 36 Fin. Analysts J. 10, 78 (1980) (citing SEC v. Dwork, Litigation Release
No. 8849, SEC Docket 181 (D.D.C 1979)).
22. SEC Mandated Electronic Filing and Web Site Posting for Forms 3, 4 and 5, 68
Fed. Reg. 25,788 (May 13, 2003) (codified in scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.).
23. Compare, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market 90-91,
104-05 (1966) (arguing that regulation of insider trading is unjustified in absence of
empirical evidence such trading is harmful to corporation or its shareholders), with James
D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the "Chicago School,"
1986 Duke L.J. 628, 642-55 (contending insider trading encourages price manipulation
and discourages disclosure of material nonpublic information; regulation of insider
trading is therefore justified).
24. It is difficult for managers credibly to signal that a transaction is motivated by
diversification rather than by negative inside information. Recognizing this problem, the
SEC recently promulgated Rule lOb5-1, which creates a safe harbor from insider-trading
liability for insiders who precommit to trades in their company's stock. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b5-1 (2011). These rules were intended to facilitate managerial diversification by
insulating these trades from insider-trading liability. But there is evidence that insiders
have used the rule to increase profits from informed trading, M. Todd Henderson, The
Uses and Abuses of Rule lOb5-1, at 33-35 (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review), underscoring the difficulty, for both regulators and market
participants, of distinguishing unloading motivated by diversification from unloading
motivated by inside information.
25. See Fox, supra note 18, at 2094 (arguing that broad application of section 16 will
lead to inclusion of both transactions that are based on inside information and
transactions that are not based on inside information, causing managers to be less willing

2012]

STOCK UNLOADING AND BANKER INCENTIVES

Sending such a signal carries significant costs for executives. The signal may compromise the firm's competitiveness in product and labor
markets, if customers, suppliers, or prospective employees infer that executives have negative information about the firm. These developments are
costly for executives, whose economic and reputational capital remain
tied to the firm. Moreover, disclosure of unloading may encourage a hostile takeover, threatening executives' private benefits of control. Thus, for
executives, the diversification-related benefits of unloading are mitigated
by the costs of the signals unloading sends to outsiders.
b. InternalSignals. - The signal arising from disclosure of an executive's unloading also imposes costs on the executive inside the firm. Colleagues, like outsiders, may infer that the executive has negative inside
information, and hence the executive's unloading may lead to unloading
by other employees. For the same reason, colleagues may be more likely
to seek other employment, or may conclude that the executive herself is
doing so.
Even if unloading does not give rise to negative signals about an executive's inside information, unloading conveys to colleagues that the executive has less of a financial interest in the firm's long-term value-and,
thus, is less likely to manage the firm to maximize that value. Particularly
in companies with longstanding cultural commitments to managerial
ownership, this information can carry important implications for the
firm's future, for example with respect to whether decisions regarding
the allocation of the firm's resources will reflect executives' private interests rather than the interests of shareholders. Thus, an executive who
wishes to unload must consider the costs associated with the signal that
26
disclosure of her unloading will send to her colleagues.
c. Reputational Costs. - Finally, disclosure of an executive's decision
to diversify may have negative implications for her professional reputation. Although portfolio theory predicts that executives will prefer to diversify away risk related to the stock of their firms, the press has increasingly criticized unloading transactions as contrary to shareholder
interests. Indeed, several executives have been publicly scolded for un27
loading that was permitted by the firm and contemplated by contract.
to accept pay in form of stock and resulting in a "weakening of... incentives [that] is a
social cost of including" these transactions within reach of section 16).
26. For this reason, the history and organizational structure of a firm are important
factors in determining the extent to which disclosure may deter a particular manager from
unloading. See infra note 31 and accompanying text (describing cultural significance of
managerial stock ownership for partners of Goldman Sachs). These considerations will also
bear on the appropriate regulatory and investor responses to stock unloading, see infra
Part II.B, and offer important opportunities for future theoretical and empirical work on
the effects of disclosure on managerial incentives. See infra Part IV (describing intraorganizational implications of stock unloading, including potential effects relating to
signaling and internal governance of the firm).
27. For example, the exercise of stock options by a group of Goldman Sachs
executives recently received significant media attention. Although the expiring term of the
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Executives may worry that disclosure of their unloading transactions will
subject them to criticism of this kind. Such criticism would be less frequent, of course, if unloading were not disclosed.
For all of these reasons, section 16 may deter executives from diversifying. While this effect has been unappreciated in a literature largely focused on insider trading,2 8 it might not surprise the provision's
Depression-era drafters. They were profoundly influenced by the scholarship of Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, who had just published
The Modem Corporationand Private Property. Berle and Means famously described the separation of ownership and control in the industrial firms of
their time, noting that the leaders of these firms owned almost no stock
in their companies. 29 For those, like Berle and Means, who thought this
undesirable, requiring these managers to disclose unloading could encourage a closer link between ownership and control in public companies. The authors' extensive intellectual and political influence at the
time section 16 was adopted has led some to argue that the provision was
30
indeed intended to link managers' interests with those of owners.
Whether or not its drafters intended to deter executives from diversifying, no previous work has examined whether section 16 actually
achieves that result. Because section 16's disclosure rules apply only to
executives, it has not previously been possible to compare how the same
managers unload when they are required to disclose and when they are
not. In the next Part, I provide the first evidence suggesting that section
16's disclosure rules do in fact deter unloading-and, thus, have an unappreciated influence on managerial incentives at public companies.

II.

UNLOADING AND DISCLOSURE AT GOLDMAN SACHS

Unloading can tell us a great deal about incentives at banks in particular and at large public companies more generally. Do non-executives
respond to stock compensation by unloading, diversifying away the incentive effects of stock-based pay? Do section 16's disclosure rules deter dioptions required the executives either to exercise or forego gains already earned, several
reports referred to these proceeds as a "windfall." E.g., James Quinn, Blankfein Cashes in
$6M Profit: Goldman Chief Cashed in on Options Received 10 Years Ago, Daily Telegraph
(London), Aug. 17, 2010, at 1.
28. For a rare exception, see Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the
Management of Publicly Held Companies, 42 Hastings L.J. 391, 419-20 (1991)
(contending that "[e] mbarrassment" related to section 16 disclosures may prevent officers
from trading on inside information).
29. Berle & Means, supra note 3, at 46 n.34, 53 (stating that while "the ultimate
control of nearly half of industry [is]actually in the hands of a few hundred men," "the
larger the ...company, the smaller ...the proportion of stock held by the management").
30. See Thel, supra note 28, at 464 (noting that Berle was member of committee
convened in 1933 to study stock exchange legislation and enjoyed considerable influence
over President's views (citing Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 385, 418 (1990))).
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versification? This Part presents evidence offering the first empirical
glimpse of the answers to those questions.
The firm I study here, Goldman Sachs, is the world's most profitable
investment bank. A former partnership, the firm still refers to its most
senior managers as "partners." All of the partners are party to an agreement that limits their freedom to unload. Because of this agreement, the
partners are required to file periodic schedules revealing details about
the stock compensation paid to, and unloading by, all of the partners,
including both executives and non-executives. These requirements are
separate from section 16, which applies only to Goldman's executives.
The schedules provide the first evidence on unloading by nonexecutives at a large financial firm. Thus, they allow us to analyze whether
these managers unload their stock-based pay. They also permit us to examine the influence of section 16's disclosure rules on unloading. Because the data are limited to a single company, it is far from clear that
these findings apply to all public firms. The evidence does, however, offer
two insights for regulators and investors concerned with the incentive effects of stock-based pay.
First, the evidence shows that each share of stock compensation the
partners receive is associated with more unloading. Second, the data
show that disclosure is associated with less diversification. The same individual executives unload less in years when they are subject to section 16
than in years when they are not. And the partners appear to anticipate
the application of section 16, unloading more in the years immediately
before the years when they are in the section 16 spotlight. The evidence
suggests that disclosure rules have an important effect on managerial incentives at large public companies.
A. Incentives and OrganizationalStructure
Until 1999, Goldman Sachs was Wall Street's last major partnership.
In that year, Goldman's partners agreed to take the firm public in an
initial public offering (IPO). The partners worried, however, that the IPO
might compromise the firm's long-held culture of managerial ownership. 31 Thus, prior to the offering, the partners entered into an unusual
agreement governing their incentives. This agreement, which limits each
partner's freedom to unload, remains in place today.
The agreement specifies that a substantial portion of each partner's
pay will consist of stock. 32 The partners agreed to limit their sales of the
31. See, e.g., Charles D. Ellis, The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs 394-97
(2008) (describing some partners' view that partnership structure had been "the vital
engine of the firm's continuing success," and their concern that IPO would compromise
partnership's unique culture and managerial incentives).
32. See Plan of Incorporation of the Goldman Sachs Group, L.P., in Goldman Sachs
Grp., Amendment No. 2 to Form S-1, Ex. 2.1, sec. 4 (Apr. 30, 1999) [hereinafter Plan of
Incorporation] (noting that "existing [partners] . . . are expected to participate" in
programs providing for ongoing stock compensation).
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Goldman shares that they held at the time of the IPO for three years. 33
Following the expiration of these IPO "lockup" restrictions, each partner
agreed to hold at least 25% of the number of Goldman shares granted to
them as stock compensation for as long as they remained employed by
the firm. 3 4 Since 2004, when the IPO lockup restrictions lapsed, the partners have kept in place the unloading restriction on 25% of the number
35
of shares that each partner receives in stock-based pay.
Goldman's daily operations are overseen by the group of approximately thirty partners who comprise the firm's management committee. 36 All of Goldman's section 16 executives sit on this committee, along
with other senior partners who represent the firm's major business lines
and regional operations. Every two years, the partners elect a class of new

33. See Goldman Sachs Grp., Shareholders' Agreement, in Goldman Sachs Grp.,
Amendment No. 2 to Form S-1, Ex. 10.26, art. II, § 2.1 (Apr. 30, 1999) [hereinafter
Original Shareholders' Agreement] (incorporating by reference requirements of section 7
of Plan of Incorporation, supra note 32).
34. See id. § 2.2. Goldman's partners typically receive stock-based pay in the form of
stock awards or stock options (or their contractual equivalents, known as "restricted stock
units" and "stock appreciation awards," respectively). The partners become entitled to
these awards, or "vest" in the shares or options, on the condition that they remain
employed by the firm for a specified period of time. Goldman's contractual restrictions on
unloading generally apply to the number of shares or options that the partner receives
after necessary withholdings for income tax. Id.
35. The firm recently imposed further limits on unloading for the members of its
management committee. Goldman Sachs Grp., Goldman Sachs Compensation Practices 11
(2011) [hereinafter Goldman Sachs Grp., Compensation Practices], available at http://
www2.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/corporate-governance/corporate-governancedocuments/compensation-practices.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). These
changes, which were implemented in late 2009, are generally not reflected in the period
studied here. Moreover, since 2004, certain executives have been subject to additional
contractual restrictions on unloading requiring them to retain 75% of the shares they
receive in stock-based pay. See Amended and Restated Shareholders' Agreement, in
Goldman Sachs Grp., Amendment No. 54, (Schedule 13D/A), art. II, § 2.1(b) (June 23,
2004). Finally, in 2008, in connection with an investment in the firm during the financial
crisis, Goldman agreed to additional restrictions on certain executives' freedom to unload.
The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Schedule 14A), at 41 (Apr. 4, 2009). Because they apply only to
selected executives, it is possible separately to control for the presence of these restrictions;
estimates of the relationship between stock-based pay and unloading presented in this Part
separately control for these restrictions. See infra text accompanying note 128.
36. See generally Goldman Sachs Grp., Compensation Practices, supra note 35, at 7
(describing composition of firm's management committee); Goldman Sachs Grp., Report
of the Business Standards Committee 51 (2011), available at http://www2.goldmansachs.
com/who-we-are/business-standards/committee-report/business-standards-committeereport-pdf.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (providing organizational chart
describing firm's managerial hierarchy). Members of the management committee receive
a greater proportion of their pay in stock than other partners. See Goldman Sachs Grp.,
Compensation Practices, supra note 35, at 13.
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partners, and each new partner becomes party to 3the
standard agreement
7
limiting her freedom to unload stock-based pay.
B. Methodology
The partners' agreement permits the first study of unloading by nonexecutives. Because of the agreement, the partners as a group must file a
securities schedule that is usually filed only by activist investors who hold
large stakes in public companies. 38 Since these schedules do not usually
provide information about unloading-such detail being the domain of
section 16-the forms have not attracted attention from market participants. 3 9 The schedules provide rich detail on unloading by all of
Goldman's partners-including both executives and non-executives.
Using these schedules, I constructed a hand-drawn dataset including
detail on each unloading transaction, consolidating them by individual
partner and year. 40 The schedules also include information on the stockbased pay received by the partners as a group. I supplemented these data
with information about each partner, including year of election, membership on the management committee, and whether the partner is, in any

37. See Amended and Restated Shareholders' Agreement, in Goldman Sachs Grp.
Annual Report (Form 10-K), Ex. 10.6, art. I, § 1.1(g) (Feb. 26, 2010) (noting agreement
applies to all partners and those "who may become" partners of the firm).
38. The agreement gives rise to a disclosure obligation under section 13(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006). The partners filed their first
schedule at the time of the IPO and amended the schedule seventy-five times during the
period examined here, each time providing additional detail on the partners' stock
compensation and unloading activity. For further detail on these schedules and the
assembly of the dataset, see infra Appendix, text accompanying notes 107-123.
39. A search of reports by equity analysts who analyze Goldman's stock revealed no
mention of these schedules. See Thomson Research, Thomson ONE Banker Research
Reports (last accessed Jan. 16, 2012) (reporting no results from search of analyst reports
on Goldman Sachs between 2008 and 2011 for "13D," "stock sales," or "option exercises").
Moreover, public sources describing managers' ownership at Goldman do not include
these filings.. For example, the Yahoo! Finance page that provides analysis of Goldman's
stock and managers' holdings relies exclusively on section 16 filings. The Goldman Sachs
Group, Inc.: Insider Transactions, Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yaloo.com/q/it?s=gs
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Jan. 27, 2012). Although these unusual
filings recently became the subject of some media attention, for example, Susanne Craig &
Eric Dash, Study Points to Windfall for Goldman Partners, N.Y. Times Dealbook (Jan. 18,
2011, 9:40 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/01/18/study-points-to-windfall-forgoldman-partners/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review), those reports emerged two
years after the period studied here.
40. 1 am especially grateful to Michelle Chen and Adrian Clevenot for their assistance
in constructing this dataset.
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particular year, subject to section 16. Table I below summarizes the data
for the entire partnership during the period I study:
TABLE

I.

SUMMARY STATISTICS

2005-2009

2000-2004
Total Number of Partners in Sample

753

Total Number of Unloading Transactions

20,205

4,962

Median Annual Shares Unloaded

40,250

5,012

Stock sales related to the IPO may confound analysis of the partners'
unloading. It is unsurprising that partners sold stock to the public in connection with the IPO; indeed, that was the purpose of the transaction.
Table I shows that the partners engaged in much more unloading during
the first four years after the IPO, as the IPO "lockup" restrictions on sales
gradually lapsed. 4 1 In this Essay, I focus on the relationship between
stock-based pay and unloading. 42 Thus, in assessing unloading in this
43
Part, I emphasize unloading that occurred after 2004.
As noted in Part I, both theory and evidence suggest that a manager's unloading activity will depend on the ratio of the value of her stock
holdings to her overall wealth. The schedules do not, however, reveal
each partner's overall holdings of Goldman shares. I therefore estimate
the influence of the partners' holdings on unloading in two ways. First, I
proxy by partner seniority: Because partners will tend to accumulate
shares over time, I distinguish among Goldman's managers based upon
the length of time since each became a partner. Second, using public
reports on stock ownership for each partner at the time of the IPO, I
estimate each partner's overall stock ownership. 44 Throughout this Part, I
control for both variables in assessing the partners' unloading.
41. In light of the IPO-related restrictions on sales, the volume of transactions
between 2001 and 2004 may seem striking. Note, however, that the agreements permitted a
committee of partners to waive these restrictions. See Original Shareholders' Agreement,
supra note 33, art. VII, §§ 7.2-7.3.
42. I leave for future work potential implications of these data for study of insider
trading. The results presented in this Part were unaffected by separate controls for changes
in Goldman's stock price.
43. Notwithstanding the potentially confounding influence of IPO-related restrictions
on the relationship between stock-based pay and unloading, I note that the results
presented in this Part were unchanged when performed on a dataset including unloading
activity before 2004. In addition, robustness checks performed on that dataset, see infra
notes 44-46 and accompanying text, yielded results consistent with those described in this
Part.
44. I am especially grateful to Chapmann Wong for assistance in assembling these
estimates. For details on these estimates and related robustness checks, see infra notes
111-113 and accompanying text.
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C. Stock Compensation and Unloading
Goldman's partners receive substantial pay in the form of stock compensation and are subject to rigorous contractual restrictions on unloading. Like all employees, however, the partners may be risk-averse individuals who prefer a diversified portfolio to concentrated exposure to
Goldman's stock. Is the stock compensation provided to the partners associated with greater levels of unloading? After considering the effects of
unloading, has stock-based pay strengthened the partners' incentives?
1. Unloading. - One way to study the relationship between stockbased pay and unloading is to compare the unloading of partners who
are paid the most stock with unloading by those who receive less pay in
stock. The members of Goldman's management committee, on average,
receive a larger proportion of their pay in the form of stock than their
colleagues, so their unloading may tell us something about the relationship between stock-based pay and unloading. Because the partners' seniority also influences their propensity for diversification, however, I limit
45
my analysis only to those managers who were partners before the IPO.
Table II below compares unloading by pre-IPO partners who are paid the
46
most stock with unloading by other pre-IPO partners:
TABLE II.
UNLOADING BY PROPORTION

or

Average Shares Sold Per Year
Average Annual Proceeds from Sales

STOCK COMPENSATION, 2005-2009

Highest Proportion
of Stock
Compensation

All Other
Pre-IPO Partners

50,164

32,093**

$7,228,541

$4,078,340**

Table II indicates that the partners receiving the greatest share of
their pay in stock unload more than colleagues with similar tenure at the
firm. Of course, it is still possible that these results are influenced by the
partners' varying levels of ownership of Goldman stock. Multivariate regression analysis controlling for these differences, however, is consistent
45. Although the partners had varying levels of seniority at the time of the IPO, this
analysis avoids comparison of partners elected after the IPO with long-tenured partners
elected before the IPO. For regression analysis demonstrating the association between
stock-based pay and unloading for the entire group of partners and featuring separate
controls for each individual partner's level of seniority, see infra note 126 and
accompanying text; infra tbl.VI (models (c) and (d)).
46. Throughout this Part, I use the standard indicia of statistical significance:
indicates significance at 99% confidence, "**" indicates significance at 95% confidence,
and "*" indicates significance at 90% confidence. In Table I1, these indicia refer to the
coefficient for a dummy variable indicating whether the partner was a member of the
management committee in a regression also controlling for year and firm size. All dollar
figures in this Part are presented in inflation-adjusted 2010 dollars.
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with the results described in Table 11. 4 7 The evidence shows that partners
whose pay structures include more stock-based pay unload more than colleagues who receive less of their pay in stock.
We can also measure the relationship between stock-based pay and
unloading by comparing the stock-based pay received by each individual
partner with that partner's unloading history. The filings do not provide
detail on individuals' compensation, but the number of shares each partner receives in stock compensation can be estimated by allocating the
stock-based pay received by the entire group of partners to individuals. 48
Based on these estimates, econometric analysis allows us to estimate the
relationship between each share the partners receive in stock-based pay
and unloading. The analysis shows that each share a partner receives in
stock compensation is associated with approximately 0.8 additional shares
unloaded, controlling for differences in the partners' seniority and stock
holdings.

49

2. Equity Holdings. - Whether stock compensation succeeds in
aligning incentives depends on whether managers' overall equity holdings increase after we account for unloading. Financial economists typi47. See infra note 126 and accompanying text; infra tbl.VI. The dataset also allows us
to consider the relationship between the proximity of a partner's retirement and
unloading. Although one might expect that a partner nearing retirement would be likely
to engage in more unloading than a partner who intends to remain at the firm over time,
partners in the latter situation may, anticipating the receipt of additional stock-based pay
over a longer career, engage in more unloading as a means of diversification. In
unreported analysis, I coded each of the partners who retired after 2004 for the number of
years remaining until their retirement. (It is not possible to discern from the filings the
exact retirement year for partners who retired before 2005.). I then separated the entire
ten-year sample into the set of partners with more than two years remaining until
retirement and the set of partners who will retire in two years or less. I found that, on
average, the partners with longer horizons until retirement unload more than those who
are nearing retirement, and tests of the differences in the means between the two groups
indicate that these differences are statistically significant at 99% confidence. I do not
report this result, however, because the analysis relies in part on evidence on unloading
during the period when the IPO lockup remained in place. See supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
48. For details on the allocation and related checks, see infra notes 117-120 and
accompanying text.
49. See infra note 127 and accompanying text; infra tbl.VII. The dataset also permits
an additional check on this result. In years prior to 2005, the filings include detail on
unloading both by managers who remain employed by the firm and those who do not,
because IPO-related restrictions on sales remained applicable to Goldman's managers
notwithstanding the termination of their employment. See Original Shareholders'
Agreement, supra note 33, art. I, § 1.1(h), (k), art. II, § 2.1. One might expect that, all
things equal, those who leave the firm will be likely to engage in more unloading than
those who stay. To the contrary, however, the evidence shows that those who remained
with the firm-and continued to receive stock-based pay-engaged in more unloading
than those who did not, a finding consistent with the hypothesis that Goldman's managers
seek to diversify away the incentive effects of stock compensation. I do not report this
analysis, however, because it relies exclusively on evidence on unloading while the IPO
lockup remained in place. See supra note 41.
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cally evaluate managers' equity holdings by measuring the impact of a 1%
change in firm value on the employee's overall wealth. 50 The evidence
allows us to examine how this measure has changed over time at
Goldman. Has stock compensation strengthened the link between firm
value and the average partner's personal wealth since 2004?
Comparing equity holdings at Goldman over time is complicated by
the shifting population of the partnership. In 2005, 80 out of the firm's
221 pre-IPO partners, who held significant endowments of Goldman
stock, were still with the firm. By 2009, only 45 of these partners remained. Nevertheless, one might expect that the firm's use of stock compensation could strengthen, or keep constant, the average partner's

50. There is considerable debate over the appropriate measure of the strength of the
incentives created by stock-based pay. Compare Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy,
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 225, 226 (1990)
(suggesting that incentives related to marginal decisions, such as decision whether to
consume corporate perquisites, should be expressed as change in value of manager's stock
and options caused by constant change in firm value), with Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B.
Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 QJ. Econ. 653, 654 (1998)
(arguing that incentives related to strategic decisions likely to affect firm returns should be
expressed as change in value of manager's stock and options caused by given percentage
change in firm's returns). Because Goldman's partners are charged with decisions that
influence returns, I measure their incentives in terms of the change in the value of the
average partner's holdings in response to a 1% change in the firm's stock price. Following
previous work, I calculate this measure by dividing the stock price by 100, multiplying by
the number of shares and options the employee holds, and weighting the latter by option
"delta," which represents the change in the value of a stock option in light of a $1 change
in stock price. See Daniel Bergstresser & Thomas Philippon, CEO Incentives and Earnings
Management, 80J. Fin. Econ. 511, 519 (2006);John Core & Wayne Guay, Estimating the
Value of Employee Stock Option Portfolios and Their Sensitivities to Price and Volatility,
40 J. Acct. Res. 613, 629 (2002). The averages in Table III were calculated using this
method and assuming an option delta of 0.9, the estimated average delta of options
granted to the partners in 2005 and 2006 based on the historical volatility of Goldman
Sachs's stock price. Average incentives without unloading were calculated by adding any
sales of stock or exercises of options back to the aggregate ownership of the partners.
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overall equity holdings during the period studied here. Table III below
describes the effect of a 1% change in Goldman's value on the average
partner's wealth over time, both after and before the effects of the part51
ners' unloading:
TABLE

III.

AVERAGE PARTNER EQUITY HOLDINGS,

Average Change in
Wealth Due to 1%
Change in Firm Value
Average Change in
Wealth Due to 1%
Change in Firm Value
Without Unloading

2005-2009

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

$319,550

$279,896

$307,627

$121,826

$218,940

$1,996,350

$2,353,025

$2,462,659

$1,241,191

$2,349,560

As Table III shows, the average Goldman partner's equity holdings
fell between 2005, when the IPO lockup expired, and 2009. In 2009, the
average partner would have experienced a smaller change in personal
wealth due to a change in Goldman's stock price than in 2005. And by
2009, the partners' incentives were less than 10% as strong as they would
have been in the absence of unloading. Of course, it is far from clear that
the level of the average partner's equity holdings in 2005, or the level that
would have been achieved had the partners been completely prohibited
from unloading, would have been optimal from shareholders' point of
view. 52 What is clear, however, is that the average partner's equity holdings provided less motivation to increase Goldman's value in 2009 than
they had in 2005. 5 3 Although stock-based pay during this period may have
51. Because the average partner's incentive depends in part upon the value of each
share of stock the partner holds, see Hall & Liebman, supra note 50, at 654-55, it might be
argued that changes in the average partner's incentives, particularly from 2007 to 2008,
can be explained by fluctuations in Goldman's stock price. While incentives remained
relatively constant between 2005 and 2007, however, Goldman's stock price rose by more
than 80% during that period. The relationship between stock price and incentives does,
however, demonstrate the importance of detailed information on unloading for regulators
concerned with bankers' incentives. In part due to a steep decline in stock prices, the value
of the average partner's equity holdings reached their lowest level in the midst of the 2008
financial crisis-the moment when regulators might have been most concerned about the
systemic significance of the partners' decisions. As I explain in Part III, information on
unloading is necessary for regulators to have a complete understanding of these dynamics.
See infra text accompanying notes 74-75.
52. Cf. John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Randall S. Thomas, Is U.S. CEO
Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1142, 1159-60,
1168 (2005) (finding that, although it is difficult to discern optimal level of managerial
equity ownership for any particular firm, observing trend of managers' ownership over
time provides helpful basis for measuring managers' incentives to maximize firm value).
53. It bears repeating that in late 2009 Goldman imposed additional limits on
unloading for the members of its management committee, see supra note 35 and source
cited therein, and that the effects of these restrictions are unlikely to be reflected in Table
III, which includes only observations through the end of 2009. More recent filings suggest
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served other important functions, 5 4 on average it does not appear to have
strengthened the partners' incentives to maximize shareholder value.
D. Unloading and Disclosure
By comparing managers' unloading in years when they are subject to
section 16 to their unloading in years when they are not, the data also
permit us to consider the influence of section 16's disclosure rules on
incentives. 5 5 Do Goldman's partners unload differently when they are required to disclose it?
Before proceeding I note that, because of the partners' agreement,
in this case the unloading of both executives and non-executives is eventually made public in the schedules studied here. But, as previously noted,
unloading by Goldman's non-executives has generally not been scrutinized because market participants do not expect that unloading information will be included in these schedules. 56 By contrast, as noted in Part I,

that the partners' ownership has increased in the two years following the adoption of these
provisions. Compare Goldman Sachs Grp., Amendment No. 78 (Schedule 13D/A) (Dec. 1,
2011) (indicating that, as of end of 2011, partners as a group owned 13.78% of firm's
stock), with Goldman Sachs Grp., Amendment No. 74 (Schedule 13D/A) (Dec. 9, 2009)
(indicating that, as of end of 2009, partners as a group owned 8.60% of the firm's stock).
54. For example, the arrangements may have helped the firm retain employees,
because recipients of stock compensation are generally not entitled to receive shares and
options unless they remain employed by the firm during a specified period. For a
discussion of other purposes of stock-based pay unrelated to the alignment of manager and
owner incentives, see supra note 13 and sources cited therein.
55. As I have noted, see supra note 18, section 16(b) separately requires executives to
disgorge "short-swing" profits obtained from a purchase and sale of the company's stock
during a six-month period, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006). It might be argued that differences
between unloading by Goldman's executives and its non-executive senior managers are
attributable to restrictions on short-swing trading rather than section 16's disclosure
requirements. For two reasons, however, section 16(b)'s restriction on short-swing profits is
unlikely to have an effect on unloading. First, both Goldman's executives and nonexecutives receive most of their shares of Goldman stock through awards of stock-based
pay, and such awards can be, and in Goldman's case they are, structured to be exempt
from section 16(b) pursuant to an SEC rule designed for that purpose. Romeo & Dye,
supra note 21, § 10.12, at 1127 ("In nearly every instance ....
it is possible to structure
these transactions to fit within the exemption provided by Rule 16b-3 for transactions by an
officer or director with the issuer."); see also 17 C.F.R § 240.16b-3 (2011). Second, stock
compensation at Goldman is subject to vesting restrictions that make it highly unlikely that
shares sold in connection with stock-based pay could generate "short-swing" profits. See,
e.g., Goldman Sachs Grp., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1394 (Schedule 14A), at 24 (Apr. 1, 2011) (noting that stock-based pay for
executives is subject to such restrictions over period of years exceeding six-month period
covered by section 16(b)). Thus, it is unlikely that section 16(b)'s prohibition on shortswing profits has a significant influence on the partners' unloading activity.
56. See supra note 39 (noting that these filings have not been focus of reports by
financial analysts who study value of Goldman's stock).
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investors closely study section 16 filings for information on executives'
57
unloading.
To be sure, non-executives at Goldman are likely aware that their
unloading will be described in these schedules, and their behavior may
be influenced by that knowledge. But, as explained below, notwithstanding any such effects, Goldman's section 16 executives unload much less
than their non-executive counterparts. Thus, even where unloading by
non-executives is subject to some disclosure, the application of section 16's disclosure rules is associated with lower levels of unloading.
1. Unloading and Section 16. - For partners who have served as one
of Goldman's section 16 executives, the data include information both on
unloading in years in which the partner was subject to section 16 and
years in which the partner was not. Table IV below compares unloading
by the same individual partners for years in which that partner's unloading was required to be disclosed under section 16 and years in which it
was not:
TABLE IV. UNLOADING AND DISCLOSURE

Average Shares Unloaded, Per Partner
Average Cash Proceeds From Shares
Unloaded, Per Partner

58

Disclosure
Years

Non-Disclosure
Years

34,028

149,497***

$4,276,596

$16,766,667***

Table IV shows that the application of section 16's disclosure rules is
associated with lower levels of unloading. The data show that, for the same
individual partners, unloading varies significantly depending on whether
the partner is subject to section 16's disclosure mandate. Econometric
analysis permits further testing of these findings, including controls for
individual-partner fixed effects. 59 The results in Table IV are robust to
60
those tests.
57. See, e.g., George J. Benston & Robert L. Hagerman, Determinants of Bid-Asked
Spreads in the Over-the-Counter Market, 1 J. Fin. Econ. 353, 359 (1974) (asserting that
market-makers expand bid-ask spreads based, in part, on frequency of section 16 disclosure
of insider trading activity).
58. "Shares unloaded" refers to the sum of the number of shares of stock the partner
sold and the number of stock options the partner exercised. Indicia of significance refer to
a dummy variable for whether the partner was designated as a section 16 executive in a
regression also controlling for year and firm size.
59. In this context, individual-partner fixed-effects tests permit comparison of
unloading activity for an individual partner depending on whether the partner is, in a
given year, an executive subject to section 16. The approach permits one to control for all
unobserved but stable characteristics of each individual partner, preventing those
characteristics from biasing analysis of the relationship between disclosure and unloading
activity. See, e.g., Paul D. Allison, Fixed Effects Regression Methods for Longitudinal Data

(2005).
60. See infra tbl.VIII.
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2. Anticipatory Unloading. - To the extent that managers are able to
anticipate that they will become subject to section 16 in the future, they
may respond by unloading ahead of time. A closer look at the data suggests that the partners may anticipate the application of section 16.
Figure I summarizes the average proceeds from stock sales for partners
who served as section 16 executives based on the number of years until
the year in which the partner became a section 16 executive:
6

FIGURE I. UNLOADING IN ANTICIPATION OF DISCLOSURE '
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Figure I shows that unloading increases as a partner gets closer to the
section 16 spotlight.6 2 Anecdotal evidence on individual executives is consistent with that finding. 63 Thus, the data suggest that Goldman's manag61. Tests of significance of differences in means showed that average proceeds during
the two-year period prior to designation as an executive, and while the partners were
executives, were different from average proceeds during the other periods described in
Figure I at 99% confidence. In unreported analysis, I recalculated these data as the
median, rather than mean, proceeds in each period; this analysis yielded results consistent
with the trend in Figure 1.
62. During years in which a partner who was once an executive is no longer subject to
section 16, her unloading may be influenced by her proximity to retirement. Thus, I
present in Figure I only data from years before the partner was designated an executive. In
unreported analysis, however, I recalculated these data including both years before and
after a manager's designation as an executive; the recalculated trend was consistent with
the trend in Figure I.
63. For example, the firm's current chief executive officer was not designated an
executive until 2002. In 2000 and 2001, his diversification activity generated more than
$62 million in proceeds. While this partner was a section 16 executive between 2002 and
2009, by contrast, the schedules examined here revealed only $40 million in proceeds.
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ers anticipate 64 the application of section 16, diversifying during periods
when unloading will not be disclosed. 65 On the whole, the evidence suggests that disclosure rules influence unloading by Goldman's executives.
It may be the case, however, that executives would unload less even if
they were not required to disclose it. For example, there may be cultural
norms dictating that managers selected as section 16 executives should
not sell the stock of their firms. If true, this hypothesis would suggest that
disclosure does not influence executives' unloading activity. To analyze
this possibility, I compared unloading by members of Goldman's management committee, who exercise a similar leadership role to that of executives, with unloading by Goldman's section 16 executives. 66 Table V below
summarizes this comparison:
TABLE V. LEADERSHIP ROLES AND UNLOADING

Average Shares Sold
Average Proceeds

Management Committee
Members Subject to
Disclosure
60,327
$7,223,632

67

Management Committee
Members Not Subject to
Disclosure
81,906***
$9,502,678***

The data show that, on average, management committee members
unload at significantly higher rates than section 16 executives do. These
managers are all in similarly senior leadership roles, but only executives
are required to disclose their unloading. The results in Table V are robust
to econometric analysis controlling for differences in the partners' own68
ership stakes.
64. Because the firm's managers exercise considerable discretion with respect to the
identification of section 16 executives, see supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text, it is
not surprising that the partners are able to anticipate when they will become subject to
section 16. Of course, the partners may experience some uncertainty with respect to the
years in which they will be deemed executives. But this uncertainty makes the trend
presented in Figure I-which suggests that the parmers anticipate the application of
section 16 with some precision-even more striking.
65. Because section 16 requires disclosure of an employee's overall equity holdings
when she is designated as an executive, the diversification-related benefits of anticipatory
unloading may be mitigated by the costs associated with disclosing lower levels of overall
holdings when the partner is designated an executive. Note, however, that section 16 does
not require disclosure of the relationship between the executive's holdings and her overall
wealth. Thus, it may be difficult for observers to infer from disclosure of the executive's
overall holdings whether those holdings were reduced by unloading in anticipation of
section 16.
66. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting that management committee
oversees firm's operations, and that all of Goldman's executives sit on this committee).
67. Indicators of significance refer to a dummy variable indicating whether the
partner was a section 16 executive in a particular year in a regression also controlling for
year, firm size, and the partners' seniority.
68. See infra tbl.IX. It might also be argued that, in addition to executives' unique
leadership role, executives are more frequently in possession of material nonpublic
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On balance, the evidence suggests that cultural norms related to executives' leadership roles cannot fully explain the differences between
unloading by executives and unloading by other senior Goldman managers. Instead, disclosure itself is associated with lower levels of unloading.
III.

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS AND INVESTORS

The use of stock-based pay to improve the incentives of senior managers at financial institutions in particular, and at public companies more
generally, has drawn considerable recent attention from lawmakers. The
evidence presented in this Essay suggests that managers unload in response to receiving stock-based pay-but that managers required to disclose unload much less.
This Part describes implications of these findings for current policy
debates over the use of stock compensation. The evidence offers two important lessons for the regulators who must now monitor banker pay.
First, these regulators should require banks to report detail on bankers'
equity holdings, taking into account the effects of unloading, rather than
the amounts of stock-based pay the bankers receive. Second, the regulators should be wary that section 16's disclosure rules will cause bank executives to accumulate large, undiversified holdings of company stock, potentially encouraging them to pursue excessive risk.
To the extent that unloading at Goldman is indicative of unloading
at public companies more generally, shareholders and lawmakers who
seek to make stock compensation more effective at aligning incentives
should consider disclosure as a mechanism for limiting unloading. And
lawmakers may need to reconsider the boundaries of section 16 in light
of the relationship between disclosure and unloading activity.
Before proceeding, it bears repeating that, because the evidence
presented in this Essay is limited to one firm, there is reason for caution
in extending its conclusions to other public companies. But the evidence
suggests that the lessons from these data may apply with at least equal
force at other firms. Even at Goldman, which imposes unusual contractual limits on unloading, stock-based pay is quickly unloaded; thus, stock
compensation is likely unloaded even more quickly at public companies
that do not limit unloading by contract. And even at a firm that provides
some public information about unloading by non-executives, managers
unload less when they are subject to section 16 than when they are not.
We would expect the effects of disclosure to be even more pronounced at
those public companies where non-executives are never required to disinformation, and thus unload less in order to avoid insider-trading liability. Note, however,
that at Goldman the members of the management committee and the group of executives
possess a virtually equivalent amount of such information. See supra note 36. Yet Table V
indicates that management-committee members who are subject to section 16 unload far
less than their colleagues. It does not appear that differences with respect to the partners'
possession of material nonpublic information fully explains the different levels of
unloading associated with the application of section 16's disclosure requirements.
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close unloading. Although further study is needed before implications
can be drawn for other public companies, there is reason to expect that
the dynamics uncovered here are not limited to Goldman Sachs.
A. Banker Incentives
Federal regulators have now been given the difficult task of monitoring banker incentives. To the extent that the evidence at Goldman is indicative of the practices of other large financial institutions, 69 the evidence presented here offers these regulators two potential insights about
the incentive effects of stock-based pay at these firms.
1. Regulatory Analysis of Incentives. - Federal regulators have repeatedly emphasized the importance of incentives for bankers and traders
outside the group of executives.70 This emphasis may reflect the fact that
many of the employees responsible for risk-taking that contributed to the
crisis were not executives. For example, none of the traders at American
International Group's Financial Products division, the unit that contributed to the insurer's decline, was an executive. 7 1 Perhaps taking their
cues from the crisis itself, regulators have for the first time looked to the
incentives of non-executives in their efforts to supervise bankers' pay.
New legislation requires large banks to report "the structures of all
incentive-based compensation arrangements" to these regulators. 7 2 To
implement this directive, a group of federal agencies recently proposed
rules that would require banks to provide "narrative" descriptions of compensation for non-executives. 7 3 The reports would tell regulators whether
69. Goldman is among the world's most well-known financial institutions, and its
compensation practices, including its use of contractual unloading restrictions, appear to
have influenced the practices of other major financial institutions. Compare Amended and
Restated Shareholders' Agreement, supra note 37, § 2.1(b) (describing requirement that
certain of Goldman's senior managers retain 75% of shares they receive in stock-based
pay), with Citigroup, Inc., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Schedule 14A), at 16 (Mar. 12, 2010) (noting that members of
Citigroup's senior management are required to "retain at least 75% of the equity awarded
to them as incentive compensation").
70. See, e.g., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., Guidance on Sound
Incentive Compensation Policies 37-38 (2010) ("Incentive compensation arrangements
for executive officers as well as for non-executive personnel who have the ability to expose
a banking organization to material amounts of risk may, if not properly structured, pose a
threat to the organization's safety and soundness."); see also Alvarez Testimony, supra note
1, at 3 ("[C]ompensation arrangements for executive and non-executive employees alike
may pose safety and soundness risks if not properly structured . . ").
71. See Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 15 (Feb. 28, 2008) (listing
AIG's executive officers, including, among others, its general counsel and chief human
resources officer-but excluding employees of its Financial Products unit).
72. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 956(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1905 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5641).
73. Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. 21,170, 21,177
(proposed Apr. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 42), available at http://www.fdic.
gov/news/board/2011rule2.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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bankers are paid in stock, but would provide no information about their
unloading activity.
The evidence from Goldman suggests that such descriptions will not
give regulators a full picture of banker incentives. Non-executives, the
evidence suggests, are likely to unload in response to receiving stock compensation, and indeed unload far more than the bank executives that
have been the focus of previous empirical study.74 The influence of stockbased pay on incentives, we have seen, depends on whether it leads to an
increase in a manager's overall equity holdings after taking unloading
into account. To the extent regulators seek to understand the incentives
of the non-executive traders who take risk at large banks, they should
require financial firms to report these managers' overall holdings of com75
pany stock.
The design of these reporting requirements, however, should draw
on our understanding of the effects of disclosure on incentives. The signals produced by section 16's highly salient public disclosures, we have
seen, are associated with lower levels of diversification activity. That result
may well be consistent with the policy considerations that motivated the
drafters of section 16. By contrast, bank regulators may not wish to facilitate signaling of this kind, which may encourage non-executives to hold
undiversified portfolios of the bank's stock.
Importantly, regulators are in a position to keep information about
bankers' overall equity holdings confidential. 76 Thus, there is relatively
little risk that these reports will send costly signals to markets, for example, by suggesting that managers have unfavorable inside information. Instead, the information can be used solely for fulfilling the regulators' task
77
of monitoring bankers' incentives.
74. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 15, at 260 (documenting "large" amounts of
unloading of stock-based pay by executives at Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers); Bhagat
& Bolton, supra note 15, at 15 (same, across broader group of firms). The evidence

presented in this Essay suggests that non-executives at those firms likely engaged in more
unloading than the executives subject to section 16's disclosure requirements.
75. It might be argued that regulators could simply assume, consistent with portfolio
theory, that bankers will unload to the extent permitted by contract. At Goldman, however,
the partners as a whole currently hold more shares than is required by their agreement.

See Goldman Sachs Grp., Amendment No. 74 (Schedule 13D/A), at 1, 10 (Nov. 29, 2009)
(noting that, although Goldman's contractual restrictions required partners to own 3.3
million shares as of end of 2009, at that time partners owned more than 16.2 million
shares). Thus, a uniform prediction that bankers will unload to the extent that doing so is

permitted by contract will not give regulators a full picture of the incentive effects of stockbased pay.
76. Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. at 21,177 (noting that
regulators will "maintain the confidentiality of information ... [requested under their
authority to regulate incentives at financial institutions], and the information will be
nonpublic").
77. The regulators could also keep this information confidential inside the firm to
avoid transmitting signals among bankers and their colleagues. See id.
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2. Risk-Taking by Bank Executives. - It is now well accepted that, for
at least two reasons, shareholders in large banks prefer that the bank pursue risks that are excessive from a social point of view. First, shareholders
capture the full upside from such risk-taking, while some of the downside
of bank failures is borne by the government, both as an insurer of deposits and as a provider of bailout financing. Second, shareholders do not
internalize costs related to the systemic effects of bank failures. 78 Thus,
bank shareholders do not internalize all of the costs of the bank's risktaking activity.
On the basis of these insights, in the short time since the crisis, an
extensive literature has emerged on optimal incentives for bank executives. 79 Although proposals for improving banker incentives vary considerably, most commentators agree that, because shareholders prefer that
the bank take socially excessive risk, there is some danger in requiring
bank executives to hold large amounts of the firm's stock. The problem is
that these holdings give bank executives, like shareholders, reason to prefer that the bank take too much risk.
The evidence presented here suggests that section 16 exacerbates
this problem. If disclosure rules discourage bank executives from unloading, they will hold large, undiversified positions in their employer's stock,
encouraging them to pursue excessive risk.80 Indeed, many have argued
that, during the financial crisis, bank executives with concentrated stock
holdings resisted steps that, while bad for bank equity holders, might
78. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers' Pay, 98
Geo. L.J. 247, 284-85 (2010).
79. Id. (suggesting that regulators require that bank executives' compensation
depend both on value of firm's equity and value of its debt to address bank shareholders'
incentives to pursue excessive risk); Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance:
Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk Regulation, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2012) (manuscript at 24), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1546229 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation and Corporate
Governance in Financial Firms: The Case for Convertible Equity-Based Pay 2 (Columbia
Law Sch. & European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 373, 2010) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that executives' undiversified exposure to their banks'
stocks gave them reason to pursue excessive risk and resist needed recapitalizations during
crisis); see also Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123
Harv. L. Rev. 1152, 1155 (2010) (showing that costs related to shareholders' preference for
correlation between asset values and contingent liabilities are exacerbated by stock-based
pay).
80. In light of the evidence that Goldman's partners unload in anticipation of the
application of section 16, see supra text accompanying notes 62-64, it might be argued
that anticipatory unloading adequately diversifies executives' portfolios, eliminating their
incentives to seek out excessive risk. But even if a manager succeeds in fully diversifying
away her exposure to the company's stock before her appointment as an executive, her
receipt of stock-based pay after she becomes an executive, in tandem with the disclosure
requirements of section 16, may lead to a substantially undiversified position over time,
giving rise to incentives to take excessive risk. See supra note 63 (noting that, despite
substantial unloading before his appointment as an executive, Goldman Sachs's CEO has
now accumulated substantial position in the company's stock).
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have reduced the systemic consequences of the crisis.81 At public companies generally, section 16's effects on managerial incentives may well be
laudable. At banks, however, federal regulators should be wary that section 16 has the unintended consequence of encouraging executives to
hold dangerously undiversified positions in the stock of large financial
firS.

8 2

Taken together, these findings suggest that regulators should pay
close attention not only to whether bankers' incentives are disclosed, but
also to whom. On the one hand, disclosure of non-executives' equity holdings to regulators may provide critical information on the incentives of
risk-takers at large financial institutions. On the other, disclosure of executives' unloading activity to the public may lead executives to hold undiversified portfolios that lead to excessive risk-taking. Regulators should
carefully consider these effects when designing the disclosure rules that
govern bankers' incentives.
B. Incentives at Public Companies
To the extent that unloading at Goldman is indicative of unloading
at public companies more generally, 83 the evidence presented here offers
lessons for investors and lawmakers seeking to make stock-based pay
more effective at aligning incentives. Most stock compensation at large
public companies is given to non-executives. The evidence from
Goldman suggests that non-executives unload most of their stock-based
81. See Gordon, supra note 79, at 2 ("[T]he critical point from the perspective of
systemic risk mitigation was that [as] firms ran into financial difficulty, the[ir] executives'
large equity stakes created an ever-widening gap between their interests and the interests
of non-managerial shareholders (as well as the social interest).").
82. Of course, executives might not hold undiversified positions of this kind if they
were simply paid in cash rather than stock. Shareholders prefer that executives be paid in
stock, however, and regulators have indicated that they will look favorably upon stockbased pay for executives of large financial institutions. See Incentive-Based Compensation
Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. 21,170, 21,212 (proposed Apr. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 42), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/board/2011rule2.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review). To the extent that stock compensation remains a standard
feature of banker pay, the evidence presented here shows that regulators should be wary of
the effects of section 16 on bank executives' freedom to diversify.
83. Particularly because there is some evidence that industry structure influences
compensation practices and incentives, see, for example, Antonio Falato & Dalida
Kadyrzhanova, Optimal CEO Incentives and Industry Dynamics 7 (2007) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that firm and industry
heterogeneity affect optimal level of CEO incentives), the evidence from Goldman may be
more indicative of pay practices at other banks than at other public firms more generally.
However, as I have previously noted, see, for example, supra note 33 and accompanying
text, Goldman is unusual among public companies in that it contractually restricts
unloading and provides disclosure of unloading by non-executives-but the evidence
shows that its employees unload stock-based pay and unload less when they are required to
disclose. These dynamics may be even more prevalent at other public firms; in general,
these firms neither contractually limit unloading nor require disclosure of unloading by
non-executives.
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pay. The data also, however, point to disclosure as a potentially important
new mechanism for counteracting managers' tendency to unload.
In addition, the evidence suggests that section 16 has an important
and overlooked effect on incentives. By encouraging managers to hold a
concentrated position in the company's stock, section 16's disclosure
rules may influence the relationship between ownership and control at all
public firms. To the extent that the rules have this effect, lawmakers
should reconsider their boundaries to ensure that they apply only to
those managers for whom stock ownership is an effective incentivealignment device.
1. Disclosure and Incentive Alignment. - Several commentators have
recently criticized managers' freedom to unload stock compensation.
They argue that unloading undermines the incentive benefits that stockbased pay could otherwise confer upon shareholders. 84 Although paying
employees in stock rather than cash may have benefits unrelated to incentives,8 5 these commentators claim that public companies instead use
stock-based pay as camouflage, convincing shareholders that managers'
and owners' interests are aligned while allowing employees to unload.8 6
Thus, they have encouraged shareholders to pressure corporate boards to
8 7
restrict unloading by contract
The evidence from Goldman suggests that disclosure may be an alternative mechanism for limiting unloading. To be sure, disclosure is a
comparatively blunt tool, offering less precision than contractual restrictions on unloading. But directors and executives have little reason to bargain for contractual restrictions on unloading.8 8 Such restrictions also
may require continuous re-contracting in order to provide managers with
optimal incentives, leading to substantial adjustment costs. 89 And, as
84. E.g., Bebchuk & Fried, Long-Term Performance, supra note 12, at 1923-24.
85. These benefits include, for example, preservation of the firm's liquidity, reducing
costs of capital related to adverse selection, and corporate tax benefits. See supra note 13
and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance: The
Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation 178 (2004) (describing "inconspicuous
diversification benefits" that managers obtain by unloading).
87. E.g., Bebchuk & Fried, Long-Term Performance, supra note 12, at 1928.
88. It might be argued that executives, who are subject to section 16 and thus likely to
unload less of their stock-based pay than other employees, have reason to pursue
contractual restrictions that limit their colleagues' unloading. But even executives own
relatively small proportions of the firm's stock, and thus internalize few of the gains that
will be generated by closer alignment of colleagues' incentives with those of shareholders.
By contrast, demanding that these colleagues accept contractual restrictions on unloading
may impose substantial professional and social costs on executives. Moreover, executives
often return to non-executive status after serving as executives; anticipating this, they may
prefer not to impose unloading restrictions on non-executives so that they can benefit
from the freedom to unload when they are no longer subject to section 16. See supra note
61 (describing analysis showing that Goldman executives engaged in more unloading
when they were no longer subject to section 16).
89. See John F. Core & David F. Larcker, Performance Consequences of Mandatory
Increases in Stock Ownership, 64J. Fin. Econ. 317, 318 (2002) (describing this possibility,
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other commentators have noted, contractual restrictions on unloading
appear to be expensive to negotiate and enforce.90 Thus, shareholders
seeking to align manager and owner incentives could advocate that companies disclose non-executives' unloading.9 ' This information would allow investors to evaluate whether stock-based pay aligns managers' and
92
owners' interests-or serves as camouflage, as its critics contend.
Moreover, disclosure of non-executives' unloading would permit directors and shareholders to meaningfully monitor incentives. Within a
particular firm, directors could better assess whether contractual restrictions on unloading are calibrated appropriately, leaving employees with
the portfolio of company stock that is optimal from shareholders' perspective. In addition, investors could compare unloading across firms to
determine whether employees at competing companies have comparable
incentives to maximize firm value.
To the extent that shareholders lack incentives to insist that directors
require disclosure of this type, 93 lawmakers convinced of the need for
mandatory rules could consider two modifications to existing law. First,
securities rules already require public companies to disclose detailed information on company-wide stock compensation, including the total
amount of stock paid to all employees. 94 The rules do not, however, require disclosure of the employees' unloading. 95 Such disclosure is unnoting that adjustment costs may prevent continuous re-contracting, and describing
empirical evidence that periodic re-contracting in form of stock-ownership requirements is
associated with greater levels of managerial ownership and improvements in
performance).
90. See Bebchuk & Fried, Long-Term Performance, supra note 12, at 1934-35
(noting that stock-ownership requirements in many public companies are "purely
voluntary" and include no "penalty for not meeting the target"); Schizer, supra note 12, at
461 (describing public reports noting that stock-ownership requirements are frequently
not enforced at large public companies).
91. It might be argued that, rather than provide such disclosure, boards of directors
will simply opt to pay non-executives in cash rather than stock. Note, however, that
directors commonly pay public-company executives in stock despite the fact that the
executives' unloading is subject to section 16's rigorous disclosure regime.
92. Of course, to the extent that shareholders of public-company banks pursue this
disclosure, banking regulators should pay careful attention to the influence of disclosure
on bankers' undiversified holdings of company stock. See supra Part III.A.2.
93. For the seminal discussion on the limitations of shareholder oversight in public
companies, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as
Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277, 1281 (1991).
94. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.201(d)(1) (2011) (requiring disclosure of, inter alia,
number of securities issuable to employees pursuant to equity compensation plans and
weighted-average exercise price of outstanding stock options).
95. While it is possible to estimate the number of stock options non-executives
exercise each year with information that must be provided under current disclosure rules,
see Core & Guay, Stock Option Plans, supra note 9, at 278, these disclosures do not
provide information on the number of shares sold by this group of employees, making it
impossible to evaluate unloading activity or the employees' equity holdings.
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likely to be administratively expensive 9 6 and may offer shareholders valuable information about the effectiveness of stock-based pay. Second, the
major securities exchanges have long required that shareholders vote to
approve stock compensation plans. 97 These rules force companies to disclose the terms of the plan but not restrictions on unloading. Requiring
firms to disclose such restrictions-or the lack thereof-might give shareholders important information on the value of stock-based pay.
Of course, there would also be costs to forcing non-executives to
hold concentrated positions in public companies' stock. For one thing,
we can expect these employees to demand higher wages to compensate
them for the additional risk these arrangements would require them to
bear. There may be firms in which these costs outweigh the incentiverelated benefits of managerial stock ownership. For firms in which the
benefits of incentive alignment outweigh these costs, however, the evidence presented in this Essay suggests that disclosure may offer an effective means of restricting unloading.
2. Scope of Section 16. - Section 16 requires public companies to
identify a few top "executives" and publicly disclose their unloading. The
provision, developed as part of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, was
influenced by a model of industrial organization that was prominent at
that time. 98 In this model, a few managers exercise centralized control
over public-company resources. This model may not reflect the distribution of control at public companies today. 99 Yet the evidence presented
here suggests that the model continues to influence the link between
ownership and control in large public companies.
To the extent that section 16's disclosure rules are underinclusive,
failing to capture managers who exercise control, the rules will not deter
these managers from unloading. To be sure, firms could simply limit unloading by these managers by contract. And contract may offer the impor96. Most public companies are party to stock compensation agreements that permit
low-cost monitoring of unloading of stock awards and stock options acquired in
connection with stock-based pay. See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 12, at 449 ("Exercise [of
compensatory stock options] is ...

relatively easy ...

for firms to police.").

97. E.g., N.Y. Stock Exch., NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.08, available at
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PLatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp-1-4-3&
manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30 (describing influence of Berle and
Means's observations on drafters of section 16).
99. To draw one example from the case studied in this Essay, Goldman Sachs's
organizational structure suggests that its management committee exercises control over
the firm's resources. See supra text accompanying note 36. Fewer than half of the thirty
members of the committee, however, are executives subject to section 16. Compare
Goldman Sachs Grp., Leadership: Management Committee, http://www2.goldmansachs.
com/who-we-are/leadership/management-committee/index.html
(on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (last visited Jan. 27, 2012) (listing 29 members of Goldman's
management committee), with Goldman Sachs Grp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 50-51
(Mar. 1, 2010) (listing firm's nine executive officers).
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tant advantage of allowing managers to engage in the amount of unloading that is optimal for the particular manager and firm. But, as noted
above, directors and executives at public companies may lack incentives
to impose these restrictions on non-executives, and there is evidence that
these contracts are costly to develop and enforce. 10 0 Disclosure may offer
a lower-cost means of aligning shareholder and manager interests.
To the extent that section 16 is overinclusive, it may deter unloading
by managers for whom stock-based pay is not an effective means of aligning incentives. 0 1 Thus, the rules may impose unnecessary costs on shareholders, who will be forced to compensate the manager for holding a
large stake in the company even though the incentive-related benefits of
10 2
that stake are limited.
For present purposes, it is not important whether the scope of section 16 accurately reflects the distribution of control at all public companies. What is important is that, to the extent that its disclosure rules discourage unloading, choices about the scope of section 16 are likely to
have implications for incentive alignment at public companies. Thus,
lawmakers should reassess the scope of section 16 in light of these implications. Of course, any such assessment should consider section 16's
traditional role as a means of regulating insider trading.10 3 In particular,
the rules may provide market participants with an important source of
information about insiders' views of the firm's value. 10 4 The proposed
100. See supra note 12 and sources cited therein (describing reports that policies
requiring executives to own minimum specified amounts of firm's stock are rarely
enforced and require relatively low levels of stock ownership). But see supra text
accompanying note 69 (suggesting that these contractual arrangements are now used
more frequently, particularly among financial institutions).
101. Although the decision as to which managers will be deemed executives is
generally left to the companies themselves, see supra note 21 and accompanying text, the
rules specify some roles in large public companies that are required to be included within
section 16's scope, see 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16a-1 (f), 240.16a-2 (2011).
102. It might be argued that the firms could simply choose to compensate these
executives in cash rather than stock to avoid creating a portfolio of shares that will be costly
for the manager to diversify. But the decision not to pay the manager in stock will, like
unloading, itself be subject to disclosure, and the firm and manager would risk signaling
and reputational costs similar to those that arise in connection with unloading.
103. Thus, any reassessment of section 16 should carefully consider the implications
of any changes in the scope of section 16(b)'s bar on short-swing profits. See supra note 55.
Many commentators have forcefully argued that, because none of its provisions turns on
the use or possession of material nonpublic information, section 16 is an ineffective
deterrent to insider trading. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 8, § 8.6, at 295. Whether or not
section 16 provides valuable regulation of insider trading activity, however, the evidence
presented here suggests that its disclosure provisions have important implications for
managerial incentives.
104. The literature is divided with respect to whether disclosures of this kind provide
markets with valuable information that contributes to efficiency in the pricing of securities.
For early empirical work suggesting that insider trading carries unique informational
value, see James H. Lorie & Victor Niederhoffer, Predictive and Statistical Properties of
Insider Trading, 11 J.L. & Econ. 35, 35 (1968); Myron Scholes, The Market for Securities:
Substitution Versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45 J.
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reassessment, however, would focus not on whether managers are "executives" but instead on whether they actually exercise control over the corporation. Thus, lawmakers should be able to preserve the informationproduction benefits of section 16 while also considering the potential ef10 5
fects of its disclosure rules on managerial incentives.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The federal regulators who oversee banker pay have come to appreciate the importance of incentives for bankers beyond the small group
that pre-crisis rules identify as "executives." Although these non-executive
managers and traders receive much of their pay in the form of stock, little
is known about whether they unload. And no previous study has considered the effects of disclosure rules on unloading activity.
This Essay has presented the first empirical study of unloading by all
of the senior managers of a large financial institution. The study shows
that bankers respond to receiving stock-based pay by unloading. The data
also show that bankers unload much less in years in which they are required to disclose than in years in which they are not.
To the extent that bankers at other firms unload in the same wayand there is good reason to believe that they do-regulators need to adjust. First, their current focus on bankers' raw stock compensation is incomplete. To understand incentives, what regulators really need is information about bankers' overall equity holdings, including any effects of
unloading. And the regulators should be wary that section 16 may induce
bank executives to dangerously concentrated positions in their bank's
stock, encouraging them to take excessive risk. More generally, investors
and lawmakers should consider that disclosure may be an effective alternative to contract as a mechanism for limiting unloading. And regulators
should reconsider the boundaries of section 16, requiring disclosure only
for managers for whom stock ownership is an effective means of aligning
incentives.
The evidence presented here also points toward broader insights
about stock-based pay that go beyond the work of bank regulators. Previous scholarship has argued that unloading at the lower levels of the firm
Bus. 179, 201-02 (1972). With respect to section 16 disclosures in particular, compare JiChai Lin & Michael S. Rozeff, The Speed of Adjustment of Prices to Private Information:
Empirical Tests, 18 J. Fin. Res. 143, 156 (1995) (providing empirical analysis suggesting
that insider trading conveys important information to markets), with Joseph Lakonishok &
Inmoo Lee, Are Insider Trades Informative?, 14 Rev. Fin. Stud. 79, 107-09 (2001)
(providing empirical analysis suggesting that insider trading does not convey meaningful
price signals).
105. The SEC last considered the scope of section 16 in 1992. See SEC, Ownership
Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Security Holders, 56 Fed. Reg.
7242, 7242 (Feb. 21, 1991). In determining the scope of the rules, the Commission did not
include incentive alignment among the considerations that firms should use in
determining whether a particular manager should be included among the group of
executives. See id. at 7242-43.
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may help convey critical operational information to executives. 10 6 For example, high levels of unloading in a single division may tell a large firm's
executives something about the division's performance or future prospects. Similarly, unloading by mid-level managers may also serve a useful
internal-governance function, as managers who unload less than their
colleagues may thereby reveal their commitment to the firm. This
internal-governance function may be especially important at firms, like
banks, in which the decisions of lower-level managers can result in significant destruction of firm value. Further empirical study is needed to evaluate these hypotheses. This Essay has, however, offered a first glimpse of
what can be learned by studying unloading throughout a firm's managerial hierarchy.

106. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog
That Did Not Bark, 31J. Corp. L. 167, 185 (2005) ("Stock trading by informed individuals
can produce information that may be extremely valuable to managers of publicly held
companies."); see also Huddart & Lang, supra note 15, at 4 (using data on stock option
exercises by lower-level employees to "investiga[te] ... the distribution of price-relevant
information outside the executive suite").
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APPENDIX

A. Data
Because they collectively own more than 5% of the stock of their
firm, the partners of Goldman Sachs are required to file schedules under
section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.107 The partners
filed their first Schedule 13D in 1999 and amended it seventy-four times
during the period studied here. All seventy-five filings used to assemble
the dataset are available on the SEC website, and all of the data used in
this study are available upon request.
1. Dataset Assembly. a. Unloading. - Data on unloading transactions were drawn by hand
from the partners' Schedule 13D and subsequent amendments. To avoid
errors in attributing transactions to partners, I excluded transactions involving trusts, such as those established to settle litigation or divorce proceedings, and transactions conducted by groups of partners. These exclusions involved fewer than 5% of all transactions described in the filings
during my sample period. Until mid-2004 the filings included transactions by both partners and non-partner employees called managing directors. For consistency across the ten-year sample, I excluded transactions
by managing directors from the dataset.
The partners' Schedule 13D must be amended "i]f any material
change occurs in the facts set forth in the [prior] Schedule 13D," "including, but not limited to, any material increase or decrease in the percentage" of their ownership.' 0 8 The schedules include "any [unloading]
transactions" "that were effected during the past sixty days or since the
most recent filing of Schedule 13D ... whichever is less." 10 9 The sixty-day
limitation results in the exclusion of unloading that occurs after one
amendment but more than sixty days before the next.
A comparison between the schedules and the section 16 information
filed for the firm's executives showed that the dataset included approximately 70% of the executives' unloading during the sample period.110
Thus, the dataset likely omits some unloading transactions, and therefore
107. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006). Section 13(d) requires a report to be filed by any
"person" owning more than five percent of a registered equity security; two or more
persons acting as a group "for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of" the
security are deemed a single "person," id. § 78m(d) (3). The partners own more than 5%
of Goldman's stock and act as a group with respect to its disposition, so they are required
to file a Schedule 13D. The firm knew that the agreement would implicate Schedule 13D;
the agreement itself anticipates the disclosures. Original Shareholders' Agreement, supra
note 33, § 6.3(a).
108. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(a) (2011).
109. SEC Form of Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101, item 5.
110. For purposes of this analysis, the section 16 data were drawn from the
proprietary Thomson Reuters dataset. See WRDS, Wharton Research Data Services, http:
//wrds.wharton.upenn.edu (last visited Jan. 27, 2012). After searching that dataset for all
transactions involving Goldman Sachs executives between 2000 and 2009, unloading
transactions were isolated and consolidated by executive and year. The resulting data on
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underestimates the total number of shares unloaded by the partners as a
whole. It is unlikely, however, that these omitted transactions bias analysis
of the relationship between stock-based pay and unloading."' There is
also no reason to expect that these omissions bias the dataset with respect
to the relationship between disclosure and unloading activity. As a check,
however, I recalculated my analysis of that relationship using section 16
data (which includes all unloading transactions) for periods during
which the partners served as executives and section 16 data were available, but Schedule 13D data (which omits some unloading transactions)
for periods during which the partners did not serve as executives or for
which data were unavailable. Although this approach necessarily biases
the analysis against the hypothesis that disclosure is associated with lower
levels of unloading (because section 16 data include all unloading transactions while Schedule 13D disclosures do not), the results from that
analysis were consistent with the results described in the Essay.
b. Partner Characteristics.- Detail on the number of years each individual has been a partner was drawn by matching the partners listed in
Schedule 13D to the partners identified in the signature pages of the
partners' agreement at the time of the IPO 1 2 or the firm's biannual announcements of partnership elections.' 1 3 The members of the management committee were identified by reference to the list published on the
firm's website. 114 Section 16 executives were identified from the firm's
annual reports. 1 15 Because unloading activity may be influenced by the
proximity of a partner's retirement, I created a separate variable approximating the number of years until the partner's retirement for partners
that retired after 2004. The results described below were generally unchanged when I controlled for this variable, although the variable was
economically and statistically significantly correlated with unloading
activity. 116
shares and stock options unloaded were then compared to data provided for those
individuals in Schedule 13D.
111. To the contrary, periods during which partners simultaneously receive stockbased pay and unload might be particularly likely to be omitted from the dataset, because
the offsetting transactions might yield no "material increase or decrease in the percentage"
of the partners' ownership, supra text accompanying note 108. Thus, the finding that
greater levels of stock-based pay are associated with higher levels of unloading included in
this dataset is particularly striking.
112. Original Shareholders' Agreement, supra note 33, at 26-32.
113. E.g., Press Release, Goldman Sachs Grp., Goldman Sachs Announces New
Partnership Pool, GoldmanSachs.com (Oct. 18, 2000), http://www2.goldmansachs.com/
our-firm/press/press-releases/archived/2000/2000-10-18.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
114. Goldman Sachs Grp., Leadership: Management Committee, supra note 99.
115. See, e.g., Goldman Sachs Grp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 24 (Feb. 22, 2002)
(identifying executives at Goldman Sachs).
116. See supra note 47 (describing this analysis). The variable measures the number
of years remaining until the individual no longer appears on the firm's Schedule 13D. This
variable is an imperfect proxy for partners' actual retirement date, because some Goldman
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2. Estimated Variables. a. Individuals' Stock Compensation. - Schedule 13D specifies the
number of shares delivered, or options vested, for the partners as a group
respective of previously granted stock-based pay. I estimate the pay received by each partner by allocating the shares and options received by
the entire group to individuals. According to the firm's compensation
policies, members of its management committee receive the highest proportion of their compensation in stock-based pay. 11 7 Thus, in allocating
shares and options received by all partners, I weigh the firm's executives
and management committee members most heavily, assuming that partners who held this status at any time during my sample period received
three shares or options for each share or option received by the other
partners, who are assumed to receive an equal proportion of the remaining shares delivered to all the partners. 118
Because the data only permit approximations of individual partners'
stock compensation, as a robustness check I ran the analysis described
below using a range of assumptions about the ratio between the stockbased pay received by executives and management committee members
and by other partners. The results described below are robust to any integral ratio greater than one-that is, any assumption under which the
number of shares and options received by partners who were executives
and management committee members during my sample period was
greater than that received by other partners.
It might be argued that an allocation of stock and options favoring
management committee members is likely to generate a correlation between stock-based pay and unloading because the data show that members of the management committee generally unload more than other
partners.1 19 But the distribution is also weighted toward section 16 executives, who unload less, which would tend to undermine the relationship. 120 On balance, it is unlikely that these estimates bias analysis of the
relationship between stock-based pay and unloading.
b. Individuals' Stock Ownership. - The Schedule 13D does not reveal
individual partners' ownership levels. I constructed an estimate of each
partner's ownership based upon public reports of individuals' ownership
managers who lose their status as partners remain employed by the firm. See Susanne
Craig, At Goldman, Partners Are Made, and Unmade, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 2010, at Al
(describing employees at Goldman who have been "de-partnered"). This phenomenon
appears to be relatively rare, however. Id.
117. Goldman Sachs Grp., Compensation Practices, supra note 35, at 13.
118. I am grateful to compensation consultants and attorneys who suggested this
approach during confidential interviews. For filings prior to mid-2004, when non-partner
managing directors were included in Schedule 13D, each managing director was also
allocated one-third of a share or option for each share or option allocated to partners who
were not executives or management committee members.
119. See supra text accompanying note 46 & tbl.II.
120. See supra text accompanying note 58 & tbl.IV.

2012]

STOCK UNLOADING AND BANKER INCENTIVES

at the time of the IPO t2 1 and changes to that ownership during the sample period through receipt of stock compensation (additions) and unloading (subtractions). 122
No such report is available for partners elected after the IPO, so I use
an alternative method for these partners, assuming that they enter the
partnership with approximately zero exposure to the firm's stock. This
assumption is consistent with the absence of unloading restrictions on
shares received before the manager is elected partner. 123 I then estimate
the newly elected partner's ownership each year using the same method,
adding my estimate of the number of shares the partner receives in stockbased pay and subtracting shares the partner unloads.
This estimate of partners' ownership is likely to be imprecise. For
example, to the extent that the schedules omit unloading transactions,
the ownership variable may overestimate a partner's ownership. These
errors may, particularly in the later years in the sample, result in significant overestimation of partners' ownership. Thus, in the analysis described below, I include both the estimated ownership variable and
dummy variables controlling for partner seniority in an effort to capture
the effect of each partner's overall stock ownership on unloading.
B. Analysis
Below I present the results of econometric analysis that estimates the
statistical relationships described in the Essay. Tables VI through IX provide correlation coefficients and measures of statistical significance from
ordinary least squares regressions using the panel data described above.
Standard errors are given in parentheses. These models, which were chosen for simplicity, 12 4 include two types of longitudinal controls: First,
121. Susanne Craig, Ben Protess & Evelyn M. Rusli, The Goldman Sachs Diaspora,
N.Y. Times Dealbook (May 16, 2011, 9:16 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/
16/the-goldman-sachs-diaspora/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (documenting
approximate ownership of each partner at time of Goldman's IPO).
122. For purposes of these estimates I treat a share of stock and a stock option each as
providing one share of ownership in the firm, and the sale of a share of stock and exercise
of a stock option each as reducing a partner's ownership in the firm by one share.
Although options provide less marginal exposure to changes in firm value than shares of
stock, see Hall & Liebman, supra note 50, at 671-72, since historical option delta at
Goldman is approximately 0.9, see supra note 50, this difference is unlikely to have a
significant effect on the results.
123. Because there is no evidence that any partner was short Goldman shares during
my sample period, I made adjustments to ensure that, in general, partners did not reach
negative levels of ownership.
124. The results presented here are robust to more extensive models controlling for
variables reflecting current and future stock returns, which could capture effects of the
partners' expectations about changes in future stock prices on unloading activity. The
results are also robust to models separately controlling for changes in the partnership's
overall level of stock ownership, which may capture changes in the partners' mutual
expectations about unloading activity by their colleagues. In addition, the structure of the
dataset raises some possibility of serial correlation of variables over time. To address that
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models without year fixed effects include controls for year, equity volatility, and the firm's changing size (measured as the log of firm assets);
second, each table reports the results of a model including year fixed
effects.1 25 In the tables below, mean values for dependent variables are
also given in parentheses.
1. Compensation Structure and Unloading. - To estimate the relationship between compensation structures that feature more stock-based pay
and unloading, I specify a multivariate regression model in which the dependent variable is the number of shares sold by a partner. In models (a)
and (b), my analysis is limited to pre-IPO partners; models (c) and (d)
include all partners, with separate controls for partner seniority. My analysis is limited to the years 2005-2009 to address potentially confounding
effects of unloading restrictions related to the IPO. "Highest Proportion
of Pay in Stock" is a dummy variable reflecting whether the partner is on
the management committee. 126 All models include a separate control for
each partner's estimated ownership of Goldman stock; these variables attempt to capture the effects of a partner's existing inventory of shares on
unloading.
TABLE VI. COMPENSATION STRUCTURE AND UNLOADING

Shares Sold
(37,685)
(a)

Shares Sold
(37,685)
(b)

Shares Sold
(11,810)
(c)

Shares Sold
(11,810)
(d)

Highest Proportion of Pay in Stock

24,463**
(10,789)

24,711**
(10,781)

13,770***
(3,390)

13,773***
(3,392)

Section 16 Executive

-36,054**

-36,254**

-34,869***

-34,874***

(14,834)

(14,822)

(5,832)

Year Fixed Effects?

No

Yes

No

Yes

Observations

307

307

1,823

1,823

Adjusted R2

0.06

0.06

0.16

0.16

(5,833)

possibility, in unreported analysis I applied a standard test for serial correlation to the
models, see Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data
282-83 (2002); those tests did not indicate the presence of serial correlation. As a further
robustness check, in unreported analysis I included first lagged, and then differential,
dependent variables as separate controls in models assessing the relationship between
disclosure and unloading, see infra tbl.VIII. The results were consistent with those
described in the Essay.
125. In unreported analysis I constructed an alternative dataset, this time
consolidating each line of data on a quarterly rather than annual basis. I then repeated
each analysis described below, replacing year fixed effects with quarterly fixed effects
where appropriate. The results were consistent with the analysis of the annual datasets
described in Tables VI through IX below.
126. This variable is of interest because members of the management committee
receive a higher proportion of their pay in stock than do other partners, see supra note 36.
In addition, because some, but not all, of the members of the management committee are
also section 16 executives, the models below can separately estimate the relationship
between the proportion of compensation paid in stock and unloading on the one hand
and the relationship between the application of section 16 and unloading on the other.
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2. Stock Compensation and Unloading. - To estimate the relationship
between stock-based pay and unloading, I again limit my analysis to the
2005-2009 period and specify a multivariate model in which the total
amount of unloading (including both shares sold and options exercised)
by the partner is the dependent variable. "Shares Delivered" reflects an
estimate of the number of shares given to each partner in stock-based
pay. All models include separate controls for partner seniority and the
partner's estimated ownership of Goldman stock.
TABLE VII. STOCK COMPENSATION AND UNLOADING

Shares Delivered
Section 16 Executive

Year Fixed Effects?
Observations
Adjusted R

2

127

Shares Unloaded

Shares Unloaded

(18,733)

(18,733)

(a)

(b)

0.8***
(0.2)

0.8***
(0.2)

-32,591***
(6,553)

-32,450***
(6,556)

No

Yes

1,823

1,823

0.18

0.18

3. Unloading and Disclosure. - To assess the relationship between unloading and disclosure, I include all ten years in the sample period but
limit my analysis to the twenty-three partners who were section 16 executives for at least one year during that period. The dependent variable in
all three models, as in Table VII, is the total number of shares unloaded
by each partner in a particular year. "Year Required to Disclose" reflects a
dummy variable indicating whether the partner was a section 16 executive in a particular year. Because certain executives have been subject to
additional contractual restrictions on unloading since 2004, all three
models include controls for a dummy variable indicating whether the individual partner was subject to these restrictions in a particular year. 128
All models include controls for estimates of each partner's overall ownership of Goldman shares. In addition, because Goldman discloses the age
of its executives, I include separate controls for age in all models. In the
final model (c), I code each partner with a separate identifier and control
for partner-specific fixed effects.
127. In these models, the correlation coefficient for options delivered to each partner
is positive but statistically insignificant. When these models are applied to a separate
dataset aggregated on a quarterly rather than annual basis, see supra note 125, the
correlation coefficient for shares delivered declines slightly, but the correlation coefficient
for options delivered is significantly positive and statistically significant at the 99%
confidence level.
128. These restrictions require the executives to retain 75% of the shares they receive
in stock-based pay. See supra note 35.
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TABLE VIII. UNLOADING AND DISCLOSURE
Shares Unloaded
(103,074)
(a)

Shares Unloaded
(103,074)
(b)

Shares Unloaded
(103,074)
(c)

-69,748***

-68,511***

-38,649*

(18,498)

(18,450)

(20,529)

Year Fixed Effects?

No

Yes

No

Individual Partner Fixed Effects?

No

No

Yes

Observations

175

175

175

0.17

0.18

0.36

Year Required to Disclose

Adjusted R

2

4. Unloading,Disclosure and Leadership. - Below I consider the possibility that the norms associated with executives' leadership positions,
rather than disclosure itself, account for the relationship between disclosure and unloading. Again I include all ten years in the sample period,
but now I include any partner who was a section 16 executive or member
of the firm's management committee at any time during the sample period. The dependent variable in each model is the number of shares sold
by the partner in each year.
As in Table VIII, 'Year Required to Disclose" reflects a dummy variable indicating whether the partner is a section 16 executive. Both models
include dummy variables reflecting the partners' seniority as well as controls for each partner's overall ownership of Goldman shares.
TABLE

IX.

UNLOADING, DISCLOSURE, AND LEADERSHIP

Year Required to Disclose
Year Fixed Effects?
Observations
Adjusted R 2

Shares Sold
(76,143)
-46,167***
(13,828)
No
352
0.16

Shares Sold
(76,143)
-45,543***
(13,769)
Yes
352
0.17

